



Outsourcing Third-Party Risk: Managing the expanding attack surface

From Chaos to control with Defensive & Offensive Outsourcing

Agenda

- △ Introduction
- △ Expanding Attack Surface
- △ Offensive SOC
- △ Changed Perspective
- △ Recommendations
- △ Q&A



△ Robin Bruynseels

△ SOC Team Coördinator @ **easi**

△ Interest in everything **defensive, tech and people**

△ Co-Chair of Cyber Security Coalition Belgium Focus Group
CIDR

%username%

A stylized, dark illustration of a person wearing a hoodie, sitting and using a laptop. The person's hands are on the keyboard, and the laptop screen is open. The illustration is rendered in shades of dark blue and black, blending into the background.

△ Joris Ignoul

△ Penetration Tester @ easi

△ Interest in everything **offensive** & **defensive**

△ HackTheBox Ambassador


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
A stylized, dark illustration of a person wearing a hoodie, sitting and typing on a laptop. The person is rendered in shades of dark blue and purple, blending into the background. The laptop is open, and the person's hands are positioned over the keyboard. The overall aesthetic is tech-oriented and mysterious.



disclaimer

Expanding Attack Surface





*We need to review everything before
it gets into production.*

Why? We trust X.

How come this server is not updated?

Which server?

*One of our users got breached
through LinkedIn.*

Why are we not protected against this?

Security Teams' Challenges

BLEEPINGCOMPUTER

"Ransomware attack cost IKEA operator in Eastern Europe \$23 million"

techradar^{pro}


"IKEA black Friday ransomware attack cost franchise firm millions"

Fourlis
Ο Μ Ι Λ Ο Σ Ε Τ Α Ι Ρ Ι Ω Ν



INTERSPORT

Holland
& Barrett



The **Blame** Game


- △ *“How did **the** penetration testers not find this?”*
- △ *“How did a single compromise lead to a domain takeover?”*
- △ *“Is our user awareness even worth it?”*
- △ *“Blame our EDR, NDR, MDR, ...!”*
- △ *“Blame not having an EDR, NDR, MDR, ...!”*
- △ *“There is nothing we could have done...”*



Offensive SOC?

“offensive SOC”

- △ Alerts => triggers to react
- △ Tailored Phishing Campaigns
- △ Targeted Web App Attacks
- △ Emulate Opportunistic Attackers
- △ Proper Setup for a Red Teaming Exercise



Offensive SOC

THREAT ANALYSIS

Identify and assess potential threats to your systems and infrastructure.

Focus on understanding the evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by attackers.

RECON

Perform deep reconnaissance to gather information on systems, networks, and users.


Use insights to simulate real-world attack scenarios.

REPORTING

Deliver real-time updates and detailed findings.
Provide actionable recommendations to improve security posture.

INTRUSION

Test vulnerabilities through simulated breaches to assess system resilience.
Emulate advanced attacker techniques for deeper insights.



Ivanti Vulnerabilities

Last year there was breach in Ivanti endpoints. An unauthenticated attacker could execute remote code through the web portal.

CVE's tracked:

- CVE-2023-46805
- CVE-2024-21887



Ivanti Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

- What do we know about the vulnerability?
- Are there POCs available?



Vulnerability Disclosure
(10 jan 2024)

https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_USx

Ivanti Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

- IOC's shared
- Testing environment for IOC's & Continuous Help



Source: <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060b>

Ivanti Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

- Testing environment for IOCs
- Deeper research into proof of concept



Source: <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060bv>

Ivanti Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

- Proof of concept code released on github
- Further exploitation observed



Source: https://github.com/duy-31/CVE-2023-46805_CVE-2024-21887

Both Defense and Offense



The **Changed** Perspective

- △ Defensive Monitoring
 - △ Attack surface discovery + continuous threat detection
- △ Offensive Testing
 - △ Testing/simulating real-world attacks before attackers do

One Partnership Approach

Benefits

- Shared context & visibility
- Faster improvement loops
- Reduces Vendor sprawl
- Consistent + actionable KPI's

Risks

- Overreliance on one partner
- Vendor lock-in risk
- Compliance challenges
- Cost vs benefit

Recommendations

Recommendations

Attack Surface

Map the AS:

- Hard exercise
- Involve all stakeholders

Outsourcing

Consider Outsourcing

- Rely on internal people
- Shortage on FTE's
- Define business critical needs

Continuous Testing

Continuous > Periodic

- Static testing fails on value
- Everchanging landscape

Measure Outcome

KPI's are key

- Define business critical KPI's
- Actionable next steps
- Stakeholders

Running

#ContinuousImprovement



questions?